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ARCHIVES LISTING

As stated in Hoosier Archives #16, the archives listing, due to its present large size, will only appear infrequently or when substantial additions have been added to the archives.  
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OUT OF THE ARCHIVES

With this issue, the reprint of an old classic appears. The following article, "On the Play of Postal Diplomacy," first appeared on 8 October 1966 in Graustark #105. The article was written by our founder, Allan B. Calhamer, and is reprinted with his permission and that of John Boardman, the editor and publisher of Graustark. Subscriptions to Graustark are available from John Boardman, 234 East 19th Street, Brooklyn, New York 11226 at the rate of 8 issues for \$1.00.

ON THE PLAY OF POSTAL DIPLOMACY

by

Allan B. Calhamer

In postal Diplomacy, there is no time for discussions back and forth between two parties; consequently, when an offer of alliance is sent, possible objections to it and questions about it should be anticipated and answered beforehand.

Over-the-board play shows that even alliances which are genuinely good for both parties are frequently questioned by the offeree. Frequently he 1) wants to know the exact variations visualized by the offerer and 2) wants to know what the alliance will do at very long range, that is, after they have knocked out their first Great Power target. Thus enough exact variations should be included to give the other player some feeling of security that you won't attack him, that you have a real intention of attacking the named enemy, and that the two of you have the capability to defeat the named enemy. The long range request is probably not a reasonable request, but nevertheless it is a frequent request, so some reasonable long range plan should be included, if there is one.

The result of all this is quite a lot of work on the first move. Later, however, the simplest notes serves to hold alliances together. Only occasionally is it necessary to write something lengthy, to a single

player later in the game (when you want him to make a major change of policy and have a reasonable case for it in terms of mutual interest).

In the RURITANIA game, 1963B, I wrote messages of the following lengths to different countries in the first move. (I played Germany. The messages were single-spaced):

|                                       |             |
|---------------------------------------|-------------|
| Austria-Hungary                       | 1/2 page    |
| Austria-Hungary & Russia              | 1 1/4 pages |
| Austria-Hungary, Russia,<br>and Italy | 2 pages     |
| Russia                                | 1 page      |
| Italy                                 | 1 page      |
| England & Italy                       | 1 page      |
| France                                | 1/2 page    |
| Turkey                                | a few lines |

The message to Russia, Italy, and Austria-Hungary asked for a four-way alliance ("RIGA," from the initials of the countries). The message to Russia and Austria-Hungary asked for a three-way alliance, calling for the same neutralized zones as the four-way alliance, in case Italy did not join. The message to Russia called for a two-way alliance consistent with the three-way alliance, in case Austria-Hungary did not join; similarly the letter to Austria-Hungary alone.

These messages laid the basis of my intended policy: alliances with Austria or Russia, preferably both, still better the three in one alliance; still better Italy, too. The remaining letters discussed minor points, opened channels of communication, hopefully lulled suspicions, laid the basis for other alliances if the eastern alliances misfired, and so on.

Russia and Austria-Hungary accepted; Italy did not. It would have been silly to offer the four-way only, because then I would have been left with nothing. There would have been no time to come forward with a three-way after learning Italy's intention, and he might decline by just not writing. As it was, England and Italy misplayed, and we swarmed over them. Turkey was overwhelmed, too, leaving four countries. I attempted to win by blitzkrieg against France, and went up to 15 supply centers; but I miscalculated and had to cover my homeland to hold it against Austria-Hungary and Russia, so could not raise beyond 12 pieces. Eventually Austria-Hungary and Russia prevailed against Germany. It was still a pretty successful game for Germany, and the serious mistakes were not in the opening.

It is well to remember that players who live closer together can communicate back and forth faster; they can then iron out more difficulties between them. Consequently they are more likely to ally at the start, and much more likely to drift into alliance later, even if they oppose each other at the start, than players who live far apart.

In 1963B, Germany was in Boston, Austria-Hungary and Russia in Los Angeles, and the other four in New York. I felt certain that the New York four, connected by ten-cent phone calls, would drift together eventually; hence I mobilized the other three, which were well-placed for an alliance on the board anyway. As it was, I had hoped to fool England into a German-English-Italian attack on France, without telling him that the RIGA alliance was in the background. Before I sent the letters, I realized that Italy would spill the beans to England,

because they both hailed from a place called East Paterson, New Jersey; they couldn't talk about the game day after day without sooner or later telling each other all they know. Consequently I should have rewritten the letter to Italy to remove references to formal alliances with Austria-Hungary and Russia; but seven pages of letters are enough, so I let the matter ride, and Italy rejected the four-way alliance, and England and France allied instead of fighting.

The press releases can be used for propaganda value. In general, I think they should be used to attempt to justify one's actions in terms of the realities of the situation, to assure allies that you are with them (in the language of a statement to the world, of course) and so on. For example, Boardman, as Turkey, tipped me off that Bruce Pelz was playing Russia under an assumed name and described Pelz as a "Germanophile." Consequently, I sent in releases full of Teutonic cliches about Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia building a new order in Eastern Europe, destiny, culture, etc. These releases became especially mysterious and beautiful around 1904, when it became necessary to attack Russia by surprise, in order to seal the upper reaches of the Baltic before I wheeled against France.

I do not believe that releases taunting or belittling the other players are diplomatically wise.

Where players play many games, it might be wise for them to save copies of their best first-round letters and copy or even duplicate them in other games. Amendments can be written in, stuff can be stricken out, blanks can be filled in, and so forth. In due course, one might have more than one set of letters for each country. If as Russia, you want to attack Turkey first, you send out the "Russia A" letters; if you want to attack Austria-Hungary first, you send out the "Russia B" letters. If you like the letters you receive, you copy them in later games. (Thus, perhaps, "I sent him my version of Calhamer's RIGA letter. He sent me Smythe's ITA.")

This "canned correspondence" would apply only to the first move, of course, but it is precisely there that you need long letters.

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### THE DIPLOMACY ASSOCIATION

The first issue of The Diplomacy Association's publication, Wazir, is now hot off the press. For any serious student of Diplomacy, Wazir is a must. A subscription to Wazir is one of the many fringe benefits of a membership in The Diplomacy Association. For a one-year membership and subscription to Wazir, send a \$1.00 cheque to me made payable to The Diplomacy Association. This is the best bargain in Diplomacy today. Other advantages of The Diplomacy Association membership:

1. Committees of Consultants across country are being formed. Each new player is provided with an experienced consultant and instructional material, free of charge.
2. For the convenience of new players, TDA is codifying in sample ruling form the house rules of the games our new players enter. TDA's only concern is to provide the members with clear and concise rules, not to interfere with a Gamesmaster's right to choose his own house rules. If Gamesmasters wish to condify their house rules to aid all players in their games, TDA will assist them.
3. For details of other advantages, see Wazir #1.